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Introduction
Two main complementary views of informality can be found in the literature: exclusion and exit (Perry et al. 2007 ). The exclusion view sees informality as the result of burdensome entry regulations that prevent small firms from entering the formal sector (e.g. de Soto 1989) . Consequently, they cannot thrive because they are excluded from critical formal sector benefits. 1 The exit view suggests that informality stems from a deliberate private decision after cost-benefit analyses (see e.g. Maloney 2004; de Mel et al. 2011 ). 2 As a result, efforts to uncover the positive effects of formalization can create incentives for firms to shift out of informality (Rand and Torm 2012) .
However, building evidence on the effects of formalization on the performance of existing informal firms has been challenging, due to potential selection bias and endogeneity. Selection bias can arise from the fact that firms choosing to formalize have different underlying characteristics, for example, the owner's abilities or firm preferences, compared to the ones that remained informal. In addition, formalization might be correlated with unobserved characteristics that affect firm outcomes. For instance, registration might be partly determined by performance if more successful firms become more visible, leading to a higher probability to formalize in order to avoid paying fines and/or bribes (see e.g. Fajnzylber et al. 2011; McKenzie and Sakho 2010) . In summary, formal and informal firms may simply not be comparable due to firm heterogeneity.
A first objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of formalization on the performance of informal firms opting out of informality, while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. We also explore whether the effects of formalization differ according to firm size. Second, we analyse the effects of formalization over time, an aspect that is absent in most previous studies. Given that registration costs can affect performance in the year following formalization, it is important to analyse both the short-term and longer-term effects of formalization. Finally, we look at the channels through which formalization can impact firms.
In contrast to most existing studies, we use a panel dataset constructed from five small and medium enterprises (SME) surveys in Vietnam (conducted in 2005 Vietnam (conducted in , 2007 Vietnam (conducted in , 2009 Vietnam (conducted in , 2011 Vietnam (conducted in , and 2013 . We define formal firms as those that are registered to pay taxes (i.e. have a tax code), a common indicator of formality in the literature (Fajnzylber et al. 2009; McKenzie and Sakho 2010; Rand and Torm 2012) . Using the formal status variable (namely Status: 0 if a firm is informal, and 1 if formal), we 2 construct our main variable of interest, Switcher. The latter variable equals 1 if a firm left the informal sector, irrespective of the year it became formal; 0 if the firm remained formal or informal during the survey periods. Furthermore, we create two dummy variables to make a distinction between firms that remain formal (formal non-switcher) or informal (informal non-switcher) throughout the sample. By differentiating between formal, informal, and switching firms, we are able to account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, through the interaction of the variables Status and Switcher, we obtain the net effects of formalization on firm performance before and after switching to the formal sector. 3
Our first results support the fact that switching firms are different from informal non-switching firms. Such heterogeneity is typically assumed in most previous studies. Second, we find that becoming formal leads to an increase in revenue, value added, and profits, in total amount or per employee. Namely, formalization increases profit, value added, and revenue levels of switchers by respectively 10 per cent, 8 per cent, and 15 per cent, compared to when they were informal. Similarly, per employee, the levels of profit, value added, and revenue are significantly higher by respectively 8 per cent, 7 per cent, and 10 per cent, thanks to formalization. Third, our results indicate that formalization is beneficial for firms, irrespective of their size. While the performance of switching firms is higher compared to those that remained informal, it remains lower compared to non-switching formal firms. Relative to time, we find that the benefits of formalization exist in the short term and persist over the longer term. Finally, we show that this higher performance of switchers results from better access to improved equipment, larger customer base, advertising, and business association membership. Yet we find no evidence of increased likelihood to apply for formal loans or improved access to credit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents an overview of the existing literature on the impact of formalization. In Section 3, we describe our dataset. Section 4 discusses the econometric approach, while Section 5 presents the main empirical results. We conclude in Section 6.
Literature review
The literature on the impact of formalization on firm performance can be divided into two main categories: non-experimental and experimental studies. The first category mainly uses crosssectional data and relies on one or a combination of methods such as difference-in-differences (before and after an exogenous event), matching, instrumental variables, or regression discontinuity. The majority of these studies find that formalization has a positive impact on firm performance (see e.g. Fajnzylber et al. 2011; McKenzie and Sakho 2010; Rand and Torm 2012) . Experimental studies, on the other hand, suggest that the costs of formalization may typically outweigh the benefits, as many firms remain informal despite incentives to formalize (see e.g. de Andrade et al. 2013; de Mel et al. 2013; Jaramillo 2009 ).
Using firm-level data from Mexico, Fajnzylber et al. (2009) show that being formal increases profits by at least 20 per cent. However, their approach relies on the assumptions that formal status is determined by a set of observable variables (matching) or through a specific functional form in the estimation equation (control function). 4 If selection into formality is based partly on unobserved characteristics, this may lead to overestimating the effects of formalization (McKenzie  3 and Sakho 2010). Fajnzylber et al. (2011) used regression discontinuity and difference-indifferences to compare firms that were created immediately before and after a business tax reduction and simplification scheme (SIMPLES), in Brazil. They found that this reform led to increased levels of registration and to higher revenues, profits and employment among registered firms. As this paper concentrates on newly created firms that opt for operating formally, not existing informal sector firms, the results can simply reflect self-selection at formal sector entry.
Monteiro and Assunção (2012) use a 1997 cross-sectional survey of micro and small firms, just after the implementation of SIMPLES. Using a difference-in-differences approach, they compare the legal status of firms created before and after the programme, in sectors affected and those not affected by the SIMPLES reform. They found an increase of 13 percentage points in the registration of retail firms, but no effect is found for other eligible sectors, such as construction, manufacturing, transportation, and services. The authors cannot rule out that the effect on the retail sector could be generated by a specific sectoral shock coincident with the SIMPLES reform.
McKenzie and Sakho (2010) estimate the impact of tax registration on firm profits in Bolivia, by using the distance between firm and registration office as an instrument for registration status. 5 The assumption is that being closer to tax office increases the probability of registration. They find that the overall impact of tax registration is positive but heterogeneous; it leads to higher profits for medium-size firms in their sample, but has a negative impact on small and large firms. They also find that owners of larger informal firms have higher entrepreneurial abilities than owners of larger formal firms, in contrast to the mainstream view (see for instance La Porta and Shleifer 2008) .
An exception to the use of cross-section data is Rand and Torm (2012) who use a matched doubledifference with the same panel data as in this study, but for 2007 and 2009. They find that registration leads to an increase in firm profits, investments, and access to credit for Vietnamese SMEs; and to a decrease in the use of casual labour, indicating higher compliance with labour regulations. Compared to Rand and Torm (2012) , by extending the panel dataset up to five observations per firm, the present study allows additional insights on the effects of formalization of firms shifting out of the informal sector. Moreover, as explained below, our empirical approach is different.
A second strand of the literature on the effects of formalization on firm performance uses the experimental approach. This recent experimental evidence suggests that the costs of formalization outweigh the benefits, resulting in many firms remaining informal despite incentives to formalize. De Andrade et al. (2013) conducted a field experiment in the city of Belo Horizonte, in Brazil, to examine government actions that promote registration of informal firms. Firms were randomly assigned to a control group or one of four treatment groups: the first received information about how to formalize; the second received this information and free registration costs, along with the use of an accountant for a year; the third group was assigned to receive an enforcement visit from a municipal inspector; and the fourth group was assigned to have a neighbouring firm receive an enforcement visit to see if enforcement has spillovers. Receiving an inspection increases registration probability by 21 to 27 percentage points, but the three other interventions had no effect. This could suggest that informal firms formalize mostly when forced to do so.
De Mel et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting that firms become formal as the related benefits increase. In a field experiment in Sri Lanka, the authors found that simply reimbursing the direct 4 costs of registration had no effect on formalization. Yet, 20 per cent of firms registered when offered an amount equivalent to one-half to one month's worth of the median firm's profits, and 47 per cent registered when offered payments corresponding to two months of the median firm's profits. In follow-up surveys, firms that formalized were found to have higher profits, but this result was driven by a few fast-growing firms: formalizing had no effect on the profits of the majority. Jaramillo (2009) reports an experiment in Lima, Peru, where registration was promoted by subsidising the full money cost and providing guidance through the process. Although most firms reported greater disadvantages than advantages of being informal, only one out of four firms opted to formalize despite the incentive. This suggests that formalization is simply not desirable for some firms.
Relative to transmission channels, formalization is assumed to benefit the firms through increased access to credit, greater opportunities to engage with large firms and the government, or greater access to training and support programmes (Joshi et al. 2012) ; but the existing evidence is weak. McKenzie and Sakho (2010) find that higher profits due to registration appear to come mainly from increases in their customer base; and there was no impact of formalization on the prospect of obtaining a bank loan. In Fajnzylber et al. (2011) 's study, improvements occur, not through access to credit or contracts with larger firms, but through lower cost of contracting labour, leading to the adoption of production techniques involving a permanent location and a larger paid labour force. Likewise, Rand and Torm (2012) could not obtain decisive evidence on the positive impact of formalization on access to credit. In examining the channels, de Andrade et al. (2013) find that registration increases advertising and use of receipt books, but not the likelihood of receiving government contracts, or of using bank accounts or loans, or of participating in government programmes. According to Bruhn and McKenzie (2014) , the likely explanation is that many informal firms would not receive credit even if they did register, or are unlikely to sell to the government anyway; and those firms that are in a position to do so, formalize when this need arises.
Data
Our dataset comes from SME surveys conducted in Vietnam in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013. 6 The surveys, covering about 2,500 firms in each year, were carried out in ten locations; namely the cities of Hanoi, Hai Phong and Ho Chi Minh City, and rural provinces of Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and Long An.
The population of non-state manufacturing enterprises was based on two data sources from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO): the Establishment Census from 2002 (GSO 2004) and the Industrial Survey -2006 (GSO 2008 . A representative sample of registered household and non-household firms was drawn from this population, using a stratified sampling procedure.
The aim was to ensure the inclusion of an adequate number of enterprises in each province with different ownership forms, such as officially registered households, private firms, co-operatives, or limited liability companies. For reasons of implementation, the survey was confined to specific areas in each province/city. In addition, the GSO enterprise census focused only on 'visible' firms (those with fixed professional premises), which resulted in an underestimation of household firms.
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Informal household firms were included in the SME survey based on random on-site identification within the survey districts observed by the enumerator. With such an identification approach, the informal firms included in the survey are those operating alongside officially registered enterprises. These informal firms may be relatively more competitive (and profitable) compared to informal firms clustering in areas with none or very few formal firms (see Rand and Torm 2012) . In this regard, the sample of informal firms may not be fully representative of the informal sector as a whole in Vietnam.
Despite the above weakness, our dataset remains unique by the number survey years (five) and the number of firms. We keep only firms with at least two observations in our sample, for a total of more than 11,900 observations (3343 firms) in the dataset. At the panel level, in Table 1 , the sample is dominated by formal non-switcher firms, which account for 60 per cent of the total number of firms, followed by informal non-switchers (27 per cent), and switchers (14 per cent). Table 2 and 3 describe the dependent and independent variables per year.
Econometric approach
We now turn to the regression analyses to examine the effects of formalization on firm performance. We estimate the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
As explained below, is a dummy variable for the firm type (formal, informal, and switching firms).
When the error term is modelled as = + , with (ε ) = and ( ) = the above equation can be estimated using random effects model to exploit the panel nature of the data:
Where represents six performance indicators, namely gross profit; gross profit per employee; value added; value added per employee; revenue; or revenue per employee. The average profit, value added, and revenue (both total amount and per employee) of switchers is significantly higher than that of informal non-switchers, but lower compared to formal non-switchers (see Table 4 ).
As highlighted in the introduction, the main difficulty in identifying the impact of formalization on firm outcome is that formal, formalized and informal firms may simply not be comparable due to unobserved firm heterogeneity. To address this issue, we control for firm-level fixed effects relative to non-switcher (formal and informal) and switcher status. Namely, we use the formal status variable Status (0 if a firm is informal, and 1 if the firm is formal) to construct our main variable of interest, Switcher, which equals 1 if a firm in our sample left the informal sector, irrespective of the year; 0 if the firm remained formal or informal during the survey periods. 7 We create two additional dummy variables to make a further distinction between firms that remain formal (formal non-switcher), and those that remain informal (informal non-switcher) throughout the survey periods; the latter group is used as control group in our regressions.
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The inclusion of firm-level fixed effects in our regression model (by using a dummy variable for each type of firm) enables us to account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between formal, informal, and switching firms. Finally, through the interaction of the variables Status and Switcher, we obtain the net effects of formalization on firm outcomes before and after switching to the formal sector. The above approach amounts to a least square dummy variable model, that we first estimate using OLS.
We then turn to panel regression by using a random effects model. It can be noted that the use of random effects (instead of fixed effects model in our regression analysis) is driven by the fact that our primary variables of interest are time-constant (i.e. being a formal, informal, or switching firm). A possible downside of random effects modelling relates to the requirement that the firm-specific effect ( ) is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. For a robustness check, we use Mundlak's approach to correct for possible violation of the independence assumption between the covariates and the error term in the random effects model, through the inclusion of panel-group means of time-varying (continuous) variables (see e.g. Bell and Jones 2015; Mundlak 1978) .
In addition to the main variables of interest relating to formal status, we include several covariates, namely (i) the gender of the owner/manager, (ii) the education level of the owner/manager, (iii) the number of regular full-time employees in log (also the square), (iv) the share of production and service workers over all types of employees, (v) the share of female workers in total regular employment, (vi) the number of government inspections, (vii) whether or not the firm owns a CLUR (Certificate of Land Use Rights), (viii) location, industry, and time dummies. 8 A summary of the control variables is given in Table 4 .
We now discuss each control variable in some detail. Unless otherwise mentioned, the average statistics discussed below are significantly different among the three groups of firms.
First, the gender of the owner/manager (0 if female, 1 otherwise) is included as female owners have been found more likely to provide fringe benefits such as annual leave, social benefits, and health insurance (Rand and Tarp 2011) , which in turn may affect firm profits (Rand and Torm 2012) . The share of male-headed firms is highest among switching firms at 72 per cent, compared to 67 per cent among firms that remain informal, and 62 per cent among firms that were always formal in the sample.
Second, the education level of the owner/manager (0 if secondary school not completed, 1 otherwise) is used to proxy owner/manager's human capital. Gennaioli et al. (2013) document large productivity gaps between firms run by educated versus uneducated managers, while Jaramillo (2009) finds post-secondary education to predict formalization. In relation to firm category, 42 per cent of owners/managers in informal non-switching firms have completed secondary school, compared to 52 per cent in switching firms and 72 per cent in formal nonswitching firms. These percentages are significantly different and highlight human capital differences between these three types of firms.
Third, the number of regular full-time employees (in log), as well as the square, are included to control for firm size effects, given that the costs and benefits of becoming formal are likely to vary according to firm size (McKenzie and Sakho 2010). The average size of firms (here number of full-time workers) is 5.5 for informal non-switchers and 7.3 for switchers; the difference is not 7 significantly different between the two groups. 9 Yet, the average size in informal and formalized firms is significantly lower compared to that of formal non-switchers (23.78).
Fourth, the share of production and service workers (as opposed to white-collar workers) measures the average skill level in the firm, which can have an impact on firm performance (Rand and Torm 2012) . This share is similar between switchers and formal non-switchers at about 69 per cent, and is significantly higher compared to the share of production workers in informal non-switching firms.
Fifth, the share of female workers has been shown to depress wage levels in firms, thereby affecting performance (Larsen et al. 2011) ; and this might result from women being less productive, being more likely to work in less productive enterprises, or being discriminated against. Consequently, the exact mechanism through which the share of female workers can impact firm performance remains unclear. The average share of female workers is comparatively higher for firms remaining in the informal sector at 41 per cent, relative to firms opting out of the informal sector (34 per cent) and incumbent formal firms (37 per cent).
Sixth, whether or not the firm owns a CLUR is used to proxy property rights. Rand and Torm (2012) typically control for this variable in their empirical model, based on the fact that household firms in Vietnam generally are able to use their CLUR as collateral for a loan, thereby easing potential financial constraints for increased investments and performance. The percentage of firms owning a CLUR is 73 per cent for informal non-switchers, 69 per cent for switchers, and 53 per cent for formal non-switchers respectively.
Seventh, for firms in Peru, Jaramillo (2009) finds inspection visits to be a major disadvantage of formalization, which negatively impacts the decision to formalize, being rated even more negatively than paying taxes. While inspections are likely to increase compliance with costly government regulations and affect profits (Rand and Torm 2012) , they also increase the probability of registering (de Andrade et al. 2013 ). The government inspection variable takes a value of 0 if the firm has received no inspection in a given year, 1 if the number of inspection is equal to or more than 1. Regarding government inspections, only 13 per cent of the informal non-switchers received a compliance visit. This rate goes to 28 per cent for switchers and 47 per cent for formal nonswitchers, indicating that formal firms are more 'visible'.
Finally, dummy variables are used to control for industry, location, and time factors. The industry dummy variable equals 0 if the firm is in low-technology manufacturing, and 1 if the firm is in the medium-low and medium-high technology category. 10 The share of firms in the medium-high technology sector is lowest among firms that remain informal. Location dummies account for the fact that Vietnamese provinces are relatively autonomous, and have implemented centrally planned initiatives with varying degrees of speed and enthusiasm (Nguyen et al. 2007; Rand and Torm 2012) . Time dummies are included to control for potential time effects. 8
Results
In this section, we present results relative to the impact of formalization of firm performance, the time effect of formalization, as well as possible transmission channels. The discussion is based on estimates from the 'standard' random effects regression, unless otherwise specified.
On the impact of formalization on revenue, value added, and profits
A first objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of formalization on the performance of informal firms opting out of informality. In this regard, Table 5A shows OLS and random effects regressions for (log) gross profit and (log) gross profit per employee. Tables 5B and 5C show similar regressions, respectively for (i) log of value added and log of value added per employee, and (ii) log of revenue and log of revenue per employee. This makes a total of six dependent variables measuring firm outcome. The results for profit, value added, and sales are qualitatively similar, both by level and per employee.
Our first result provides evidence that switching firms are different from informal non-switching firms. In most of the previous studies, such a difference was assumed but not assessed. Looking at the coefficient of Switcher, we find that the profit, value added, and revenue levels of switchers are significantly higher by respectively 18 per cent, 32 per cent, and 29 per cent compared to those of informal non-switchers. 11 Likewise, per employee, the levels of profit, value added, and revenue are significantly higher by respectively 20 per cent, 32 per cent, and 39 per cent. 12 By comparing the regression coefficients between switchers and formal non-switchers, it can also be noted that firms that switch from informal to formal have significantly lower profit, value added, and revenue (both in total and per employee) compared to non-switching formal firms.
Our second result indicates that becoming formal leads to an increase in revenue, value added, and profits, as shown by the coefficient of 'Switcher (after formalization)'. Indeed, formalization increases total amount of profit, value added, and revenue of switchers significantly, by respectively 10 per cent, 8 per cent, and 15 per cent, compared to when they were informal. Similarly, per employee, the levels of profit, value added, and revenue are significantly higher by respectively 8 per cent, 7 per cent, and 10 per cent, thanks to formalization. In comparing the performance of switchers (after formalization) and formal non-switchers, we find that the performance of switching firms remains lower compared to that of incumbent formal firms, for all performance indicators except revenue level. 13
Several other control variables are noteworthy in Tables 5 (A, B, and C). These variables tend to have the same effects on profits, value added, and revenues (on both total and per capita levels). First, the share of female employees has a negative impact, but the channel through which this 11 As we are using a semi-logarithmic functional form, we estimate the effect of a dummy variable coefficient on the dependent variable as:
where ĉ is the dummy variable coefficient and (ĉ) its variance (see Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980; Kennedy 1981 9 happens is unclear, as previously mentioned. Second, firm size has a positive impact on profits, although at a decreasing rate given that the square of firm size is negative and significant. Third, receiving at least one compliance inspection is positively related to profits, value added, and revenue, both in total amount or per employee. As suggested by Rand and Torm (2012) , although this may seem counterintuitive, it may be the case that inspections enhance labour productivity by forcing firms to comply with labour regulations, thereby attracting more productive workers; or improve product quality by pushing firms to comply with hygiene and safety standards. Whether the owner or manager of the firm has completed secondary school matters positively, while the share of production workers has a negative impact; highlighting the importance of human capital and skills.
Following McKenzie and Sakho (2010) , we divided the sample in groupings of 0 to 1, 2 to 5, and 6 or more workers (for comparability) to analyse the impact of formalization on different firm size category. Results are presented in Tables 6A, 6B, and 6C. Looking at the coefficient of 'Switcher (after formalization)', we find that, for very small firms, the benefits of switching from informal to formal are positive but not significant. For firms in the middle and large size group, the benefits of formalization are positive. 14 Overall, these results suggest that formalization is beneficial for firms that choose to do so, irrespective of their size; which is somehow consistent with firms making rational decisions relative to formalization.
On the persistence of formalization effects
A second objective of this study is to analyse the effects of formalization over time, an aspect that is absent in most previous studies. Given that registration costs can affect performance outcomes (negatively) in the year immediately following formalization, the potential benefits of formalization can materialize with a delay. It is therefore important to analyse both the short-term and longerterm effects of formalization.
To analyse persistence, we start by including a variable 'Time since Switching', which measures the number of years since a firm has shifted out of the informal sector in our sample. In the first survey year, 2005, all firms were either formal or informal. The first switchers are recorded in 2007, with formalization having taken place between 2005 and 2007. 15 For all switching firms, we assume that formalization took place in the year between the two surveys. As a result, for firms that were informal in 2005 but formal in 2007, the year of formalization is 2006; and the numbers of years since switching is 1 given that the survey took place in 2007. For these firms that switched in 2007, the number of years since switching becomes 1 in 2007, 3 in 2009, 5 in 2011, and 7 in 2013. 16 For firms that switched in 2009, the number of years since switching is 1 in 2009, 3 in 2011, and 5 in 2013. Finally, for firms that became formal in 2011, the number of years since switching is 1 in 2011 and 3 in 2013, the year of the last survey. In total, the number of firms that switched from the informal to the formal sector for 3, 5, and 7 years is, respectively, 325, 183, and 89.
The results are shown in Tables 7A, 7B , and 7C, under the 'Time trend' column, for OLS and standard random effects. 17 It can be noted that the coefficient of the variable Switcher remains positive and significant for all outcome indicators, confirming that they are different from firms that remain informal. The coefficient of 'Time since Switching' is positive and significant for all six outcome variables, indicating increasing benefits from formalization as time goes by. A second way to analyse time effect is by looking at formalization benefits after a specific length of time (1, 3, 5, and 7 years). To do so, we create a dummy variable for each length of time using the variable 'Time since Switching'. For profits, we find that the coefficients are positive and significant for all lengths of time (1, 3, 5, and 7), as well as for value added. For total amount of revenue, the effect is positive and significant for lengths 1, 3, and 5 years, but not for length 7; while for revenue per employee, the effects of formalization are positive and significant at all lengths. Our results are therefore supportive of the fact that the benefits of formalization materialize in the short term (length 1) and persist over time (length 3 to 7 years).
On the transmission channels
There are a number of possible channels through which formality can have a positive impact on firm outcome. These channels include, for example, access to credit, greater opportunities to engage with large firms and the government, or greater access to training and support programmes (Joshi et al. 2012 ); opportunity to enlarge customer base and lower the costs of corruption (McKenzie and Sakho 2010); ability to lower the cost of contracting labour (Fajnzylber et al. 2011 ). These channels can be used in designing policies intended to promote registration.
This section analyses some channels through which formalization can benefit firms, namely access to better equipment, to a larger customer pool, to formal credit, to business association membership, and to more advertising (see Table 8 ). We also look at whether formalization has some behavioural implications relative to formal loan applications. We focus on switchers and their behaviour before and after formalization.
We find that switchers differ from informal non-switchers as they tend to have increased access to powered equipment, particularly when they shift out of the informal sector. In the latter case, the probability of using powered equipment (or both manual and powered equipment) increases significantly, but by a mere 2 per cent. The customer base of switchers tends to be smaller than that of informal non-switching firms, but increases significantly when they formalize, by 13 per cent. 18 This suggests that some firms may switch out of the informal sector in order to alleviate the constraint of a small customer base.
With regard to access to credit, we find that switchers have greater probability of accessing formal loans compared to informal non-switchers. 19 Yet access to credit does not increase with formalization (as in Fajnzylber et al. 2011; McKenzie and Sakho 2010; Rand and Torm 2012) . A similar result applies to formal loan applications: switchers are more likely to apply for formal loans than informal non-switchers, but formalization does not change their behaviour, in line with de Andrade et al. (2013).
Our results suggest that switchers have an increased likelihood of being a member of a business association, which can introduce the entrepreneur to new technologies or ways of doing business (Fajnzylber et al. 2011 ), but only after they become formal (not before). Similarly, the likelihood of advertising increases for switchers, compared to informal non-switchers, after they shift out of the informal sector (see also de Andrade et al. 2013 ).
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In summary, we find that formalization can benefit informal firms through better access to improved equipment, larger customer base, advertising, and business association membership. However, we find no evidence of increased likelihood of applying for formal loans or improved access to credit, a key reason often put forward to explain formalization of informal firms.
Conclusion
Using a panel dataset consisting of five waves of SME surveys in Vietnam, this paper analyses the impact of formalization on firm performance, the persistence of these effects in the longer term, and the channels through which these impacts materialized. Such an analysis has been challenging because of potential selection bias and endogeneity, due to the fact that firms choosing to formalize can have different underlying characteristics, such as the owner's abilities or firm preferences, compared to those that remained informal.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we created dummy variables that distinguish between three groups of firms: those that remain informal, those that switch to the formal sector, and those that were formal in the first place. Moreover, through the interaction of the variables for firm status (formal vs informal) and the dummy variable for firms that shift out of the informal sector, we obtain the net effects of formalization on informal switchers, after they opt out of the informal sector.
Our results show that switching firms are different from informal non-switching firms. Such heterogeneity is typically assumed in most previous studies. Second, we find that becoming formal leads to an increase in profits, value added, and revenue, in total amount or per employee. Third, formalization is found to be beneficial for firms, irrespective of their size. While the performance of switching firms is higher compared to firms that remained informal, it remains lower compared to non-switching formal firms. Fourth, the benefits of formalization materialize in the short term and persist over time. Finally, we show that benefits of formalization run through better access to improved equipment, a larger customer base, advertising, and business association membership; interestingly, not through improved access to credit.
Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that firms rationally make the decision to formalize by comparing the costs and the benefits. The firms that formalize, on average, made the right decision. Consequently, the results of this study highlight the need for a policy mix that reduces the cost of registration, showcases the potential benefits of formalization, and further increases the attractiveness of the formal sector. The latter strategy could put into place supportive measures to facilitate access to credit, to production equipment, or production facilities. Yet policy makers should also be aware that, for some firms, formalization may simply not be an option.
Tables
Note: All tables are based on the author's analyses using data and methods as described in the text. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In Mundlak's model, the panel mean of independent variables is included in the regression, except: Formal non-switcher, Switcher (from informal to formal), Switcher (after formalization). Source: Author's calculation. Q. 1 corresponds to 0 to 1 workers; Q. 2 corresponds to 2 to 5 workers; Q. 3 corresponds to 6 workers and more. Source: Author's calculation. Owner/manager completed secondary school 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** Formal non-switcher 0.99*** -0.05 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.74*** 1.60*** (0.21) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.25) (0.28) Switcher (from informal to formal) 0.45* -0.45*** 0.41*** 0.32** -0.38 0.51 (0.24) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.31) (0.38) Switcher (after formalization) 0.53** 0.56*** -0.14 -0.03 0.82*** 0.89*** (0.22) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.28) (0.32) Share of female employees -1.67*** 0.28*** -0.66*** -0.66*** 0.81*** 0.51** (0.21) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24) (0.21) Share of production workers -0.36* 0.23* 0.52*** 0.51*** -1.47*** -2.33*** (0.21) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.30) (0.26) Firm size (log (1+employment)) 1.27*** -0.19* 1.07*** 1.06*** 2.44*** 2.33*** (0.23) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.27) (0.24) Firm size square (log (1+employment)) -0.14*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.20*** -0.17*** (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) Gender of owner/manager (female = 0, male = 1) 0.06 0.04 -0.30*** -0.29*** 0.21* -0.10 (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) Own land use right certificate, CLUR (no = 0, yes = 1) 0.03 0.17*** -0.06 -0.09 0.07 0.05 (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) Compliance inspections (no = 0, yes = 1) 0.02 -0.60*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.35*** 0.01 (0.10) (0 
